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OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
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ARJEN W. JAGER, NADA 
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EDMUNDS, LLOYD WALTERS, 
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V, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 890642-CA 
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Third-Party 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
LEON SPROUSE, 
Third-Party 
Defendant-Appellant. 
JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal as of right from the judgment of the 
Court in a civil case following a bench trial. The Utah Supreme 
Court had jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (j) 
(Supp. 1989). The Supreme Court transferred this case to the 
Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (Supp. 
1989) . This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1989). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Is a modification of the payment terms of a real 
estate commission required by the statute of frauds to be in 
writing and signed by the real estate broker? 
2. Did the evidence establish as a matter of law that 
Edmunds consented to and accepted the modification of a contract 
for payment of a real estate commission and was the trial 
court's finding, that Edmunds did not consent to the modifica-
tion , contrary to the great weight of the evidence? 
3. May a party selectively claim the benefits of lien, 
interest, and attorney fee provisions of a contract while 
repudiating other integral portions of the same contract? 
4. Did the trial court err in awarding Edmunds-all of his 
attorney fees incurred in this litigation where most of the fees 
were not related to the point on which plaintiff prevailed? 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4 (1989) , as in effect at the times 
in issue, provided, in pertinent part, as follows: 
In the following cases, every agreement 
shall be void unless such agreement, or some 
note or memorandum thereof, is in writing 
subscribed by the party to be charged 
therewith: 
(5) Every agreement authorizing or 
employing an agent or broker to purchase or 
sell real estate for compensation. 
Section 25-5-4 was amended in 1989 effective April 24, 
2 
1989, but no substantive changes were made in the quoted 
provisions. Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4 (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Of The Case. 
This is a civil case to recover a real estate commission. 
The case arises out of the sale of a motel in St. George, Utah. 
Numerous other claims were asserted among the parties but are 
not relevant to the issues raised on appeal. 
B. Course Of Proceedings And Disposition Below. 
Leon Sprouse commenced this action on September 10, 1986, 
by filing a complaint against Arjen W. Jager to declare a 
forfeiture of Jager's interest, under a Uniform Real Estate 
Contract, in the motel which Jager had purchased from Sprouse. 
(R. vol. I, pp. 1-7.) Artie Edmunds, although not then a party 
to the action, filed an affidavit claiming an interest in the 
property. (R. vol. I, p. 47.) Sprouse ultimately amended his 
complaint to seek judicial foreclosure of all interests inferior 
to his vendor's interest under the Uniform Real Estate Contract, 
and named Artie Edmunds and others as additional defendants. 
(R. vol. I, pp. 93-103.) Arjen Jager asserted a counterclaim 
against Sprouse alleging that Sprouse made fraudulent mis-
representations to induce Jager to purchase the motel, and filed 
a cross-claim against Artie Edmunds making essentially the same 
allegations. (R. vol. I, pp. 107-20.) Edmunds filed a counter-
claim against Sprouse for a declaration that he had a lien on 
3 
the motel pursuant to a "Note/Agreement/Assignment" and alleged 
that his lien should be paid first from the proceeds of any 
foreclosure sale, and also cross-claimed against Jager for 
foreclosure of that lien. (R. vol. I, pp. 126-34.) 
A judgment and decree of foreclosure was ultimately entered 
against the defendants. (R. vol. II, pp. 96-99, 190.) The 
property was sold at a sheriff's sale on December 10, 1987, and 
the property was sold to Leon Sprouse for a credit bid of 
$360,000.00. (R. vol. II, pp. 102-03.) The remaining claims by 
and against Jager were subsequently dismissed by stipulation of 
the parties. (R. vol. II, pp. 194-95.) 
On October 22, 1987, which was subsequent to the hearing 
which resulted in the Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure, but 
prior to the entry of that Judgment, Roy N. Larsen, Artie 
Edmunds, and Interwest Commercial Properties, as third-party 
plaintiffs, filed a "Third-Party Complaint in Intervention" 
against Leon Sprouse, as third-party defendant. (R. vol. II, 
pp. 83-90.) The Third-Party Complaint in Intervention sought 
recovery of a real estate commission from Sprouse. Sprouse 
counterclaimed asserting that the third-party plaintiffs had 
misrepresented Jager's financial ability and sought dismissal of 
the claim for a commission and judgment for damages. (R. vol. 
II, pp. 111-20.) The case proceeded to trial on the Third-Party 
Complaint in Intervention and Sprouse's counterclaim in the 
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third-party action.1 The court after trial found the issues in 
favor of the third-party plaintiffs and entered Reinstated 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Reinstated Judgment 
on July 12, 1989.2 (R. vol. II, pp. 147-53, 154-55.) 
Sprouse filed his Notice of Appeal on August 10, 1989. (R. 
vol. Ill, pp. 194-95.) At the time the Notice of Appeal was 
filed, Sprouse had pending a motion under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) 
for relief from the "Order Reinstating Original Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and the Original Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc.11 
(R. vol. Ill, pp. 162-65.) The motion was denied by Order 
entered on September 1, 1989. (R. vol. Ill, pp. 201-02.) 
C. Statement Of Facts, 
This action arises out of the sale of the Oasis Motel in 
St. George, Utah. Leon Sprouse, the owner of the motel, had 
1Sprouse is unaware of any order which formally dismissed 
Sprouse!s initial complaint against Edmunds or Edmunds' counter-
claim against Sprouse. 
2The convoluted procedural history which led to the entry 
of "reinstated11 findings, conclusions and judgment is not 
relevant to the issues raised on appeal and is not set forth in 
detail. Briefly stated, Edmunds submitted proposed findings of 
fact and conclusions of law and a judgment, and Sprouse objected 
to the form of the proposals. The proposals were nevertheless 
inadvertently signed by the court, but not entered, and were 
subsequently vacated by minute entry. The court then initially 
sustained Sprouse's objections to the proposed findings and 
conclusions and directed Edmunds to prepare a new proposal. 
Edmunds thereafter asserted that Sprouse's initial objection had 
been untimely and requested that the initial findings of fact 
and conclusions of law and judgment be reinstated. Sprousefs 
counsel inadvertently failed to appear at the hearing on the 
motion for reinstatement, and the motion was granted. Sprouse 
thereafter moved to vacate the reinstated findings and judgment. 
The court denied the motion to vacate. 
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signed a listing agreement with Interwest Commercial Properties, 
but it had expired on October 12, 1984. (Exhibit No. 1.) In 
February, 1985, Artie Edmunds, a real estate sales agent for 
Interwest Commercial Properties (Tr. 77) , contacted Sprouse to 
inquire whether he would be interested in selling the motel to a 
potential purchaser whom Edmunds had located. (Tr. 84, 165.) 
No listing agreement was in force at that time. The prospective 
purchaser, Arjen Jager, had no cash and offered other properties 
in trade for the down payment. (Tr. 167.) An Earnest Money 
Sales Agreement was ultimately signed between Arjen Jager and 
Leon Sprouse on March 11, 1985. (Exhibit No. 2, copy attached 
in Appendix C.) 
The Earnest Money Sales Agreement included a- provision 
signed by Sprouse wherein Sprouse agreed to pay "Artie Edmunds-
Interwest Commercial Properties" a $25,000.00 real estate 
commission. Sprouse testified that Edmunds had agreed, prior to 
Sprouse signing the Earnest Money Sales Agreement, that payment 
of the commission was contingent on Jager performing his 
obligations under the contract, and agreed to include a pro-
vision to that effect in the final closing documents. (Tr. 177-
78.) Edmunds disputed that testimony. (Tr. 118.) 
The transaction closed on Friday, March 29, 1985. The 
closing documents were prepared by James Ivins, an attorney and 
owner of Meridian Title Company. (Tr. 211.) The Earnest Money 
Sales Agreement was replaced by a Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
(Exhibit No. 3.) Ivins also prepared a "Note/Agreement/Assign-
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ment" to set forth the obligation to pay the real estate 
commission. It is this Note/Agreement/Assignment (hereinafter 
"NAA") which was the primary focus of the controversy in this 
action. 
Mr. Ivins testified that his instructions on what to 
prepare for the closing regarding the real estate commission 
came only from Mr. Edmunds. (Tr. 215.) He testified that the 
instructions came both by telephone call (Id.) and by a note 
mailed to him by Mr. Edmunds. (Tr. 236, 243, Exhibit No. 24.) 
Ivins specifically testified that Edmunds instructed Ivins that 
Sprouse was to have no personal liability for the real estate 
commission if Jager defaulted. (Tr. 213-14, 245-47.) Edmunds 
acknowledged giving instructions to Ivins that payment of the 
commission was to be deferred and paid over 48 months (Tr. 104), 
and acknowledged that he had sent a note (Exhibit 24) to Mr. 
Ivins concerning the commission. (Tr. 256, 1. 21-22.) Edmunds 
denied making any statements to Ivins regarding what would 
happen on the real estate commission if Jager defaulted in his 
payments (Tr. 105), and specifically denied that he had agreed 
that Sprouse would not be personally liable for the real estate 
commission. (Tr. 118.) 
The NAA was signed by Leon Sprouse with the other documents 
at the closing. (Tr. 117, 176, 217.) The NAA is signed only by 
Sprouse. Ivins prepared the NAA for signature only by Sprouse 
because promissory notes are usually signed only by the promisor 
T 
(Tr. 233), and because he was not aware of the statute of frauds 
relating to real estate commission agreements. (Tr. 242.) 
On the following Tuesday, April 2, 1985, Interwest Commer-
cial Properties assigned the NAA to Edmunds. (Tr. 121, Exhibit 
16.) On April 24, 1985, Edmunds assigned the NAA to Draper Bank 
& Trust as security for a loan. (Tr. 123, Exhibit 17.) He 
reacquired the NAA on September 24, 1986, after this action was 
commenced. (Tr. 124; Exhibit 19.) 
Jager took possession of the motel on April 1, 1985. (Tr. 
48.) He made his payments on the contract regularly until May, 
1986. (R. vol. I, p. 158.) A portion of each of the payments 
had been applied to the real estate commission, and the remain-
ing principal balance of the $25,000.00 commission, at the time 
Jager stopped making payments, was $19,226.80. (Exhibit 21.) 
Jager relinquished possession of the motel to Sprouse on June 
28, 1987 (Tr. 50, 51, 61), and Sprouse purchased the motel at 
the foreclosure sale. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court found that Sprouse did not carry his burden 
of proof in proving that there had been a modification of the 
agreement to pay a real estate commission which was initially 
set forth in the Earnest Money Sales Agreement. The trial 
courtfs finding was based in part on the legal conclusion that 
any modification of the payment terms for the real estate 
commission was within the statute of frauds and required to be 
signed by the broker. The statute of frauds does not, however, 
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apply to modifications of the payment terms of a real estate 
commission contract. The statute of frauds requires only that 
the contract of employment (the agreement to pay a commission) 
be in writing. Once the contract of employment is in writing, 
the parties may modify the payment provisions of that contract 
by parol. Where the trial court's factual finding was based on 
an erroneous assumption of law, the case must be remanded for a 
new trial. 
The trial court's finding, that Sprouse failed to carry his 
burden of proof of showing that the real estate commission 
agreement was modified, was also contrary to the great weight of 
the evidence. Every witness with personal knowledge of the 
facts, except for Edmunds, testified that Edmunds 'had agreed 
that Sprouse would not be personally liable for the commission. 
The evidence further established, without dispute, that Edmunds 
treated the NAA as being the sole document which governed the 
real estate commission obligation. This is reflected in an 
assignment of the NAA on the Tuesday following the Friday 
closing, and continuing through the initial pleadings filed by 
Edmunds in this action. His self-serving denial of consent to 
the NAA was contrary to the great weight of the evidence and the 
court erred in failing to find that he had consented to the NAA. 
Notwithstanding the trial court's conclusion that Sprouse 
could not enforce the beneficial provisions of the NAA, the 
trial court enforced those provisions of the NAA adverse to 
Sprouse. Piecemeal enforcement of a contract is not permis-
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sible. Either the entire contract was agreed to by the parties, 
or no portion of it was. The trial court's award of pre-
judgment interest at 12% per annum and the award of attorney 
fees were both based on provisions of the NAA and must therefore 
be vacated. 
The award of attorney fees is, in any event, not supported 
by the evidence. Edmunds was entitled to recover attorney fees, 
if at all, only with respect to the issues on which he pre-
vailed. The testimony showed that only one-third of the 
$9,000.00 attorney fees were incurred with respect to the issues 
on which Edmunds prevailed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE MODIFICATION OF THE REAL ESTATE 
COMMISSION AGREEMENT WAS NOT WITHIN THE 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS-
The trial court's finding that "defendant has failed to 
meet his burden of proof on his claim that there was a written 
or oral modification of his obligation to pay a commission" 
(Reinstated Findings of Fact, para. 8, R. vol. Ill, p. 149) was 
based in part on the court's legal conclusion that any modifica-
tion of the real estate agreement was required by the statute of 
frauds to be in writing. (Conclusions of Law, para. 4, R. vol. 
Ill, p. 152.) Review of this question of statutory construction 
should be under a correctness standard with no deference given 
to the trial court's ruling nor to the finding based thereon. 
Nephi City v. Hansen, 779 P.2d 673, 674 (Utah 1989). 
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Sprouse acknowledges for the purpose of this appeal that 
the Agreement to Pay Real Estate Commission contained in the 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement dated March 11, 1985, constituted 
an enforceable obligation pay a real estate commission.3 The 
record in this case establishes, however, that there was a 
subsequent modification of that agreement, the terms of which 
are set forth in the Note/Agreement/Assignment ("NAA") dated 
April 1, 1985. The NAA was signed, however, only by Leon 
Sprouse and was not signed by Edmunds or his principal broker. 
The trial court held that the modification was barred by the 
statute of frauds. 
The statute of frauds does not apply to this modification 
because (1) the NAA modified only the terms of payment, whereas 
the writing requirement of the statute of frauds applies only to 
the term of employment, (2) neither Edmunds nor his broker was 
the "party to be charged" and their signatures were not required 
by the statute of frauds, and (3) the requisite signature was 
provided in any event by documents signed by Edmunds and his 
broker as part of the same transaction. These arguments are 
addressed in order. 
3Sprouse contended at trial that the agreement was unen-
forceable because of Edmunds1 failure to procure a ready, 
willing, and able buyer, and by Edmunds1 misrepresentations 
concerning Jager's ability to pay for and operate the motel. 
The facts were in dispute with respect to that issue, and the 
trial court found the issues in favor of Edmunds. Sprouse 
accordingly does not challenge that finding on appeal. 
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A* Because The NAA Altered Only Terms Of Commission Payment. 
And Not Terms Authorizing The Broker To Sell, The NAA Is 
Not Within The Statute Of Frauds. 
The general rule governing modifications of contracts 
within the statute of frauds is "that if the original agreement 
is within the statute of frauds, a subsequent agreement that 
modifies any of the material parts of the original must also 
satisfy the statute." Allen v. Kingdom, 723 P.2d 394, 396 (Utah 
1986) (emphasis added). Yet, there are many exceptions. As 
indicated above, if a subsequent modification is not a "material 
part" of the contract, the modification is not within the 
statute. The discerning question is what is a "material part" 
of the contract. 
In C. J. Realty, Inc. v. Willev, 758 P. 2d 923~ (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988), the court discussed what is "material" in a broker's 
contract. After finding that Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4(5) applies 
to brokers1 contracts generally, including finders' contracts, 
the court said that "the essential part of a contract to employ 
a real estate broker, so far as the statute of frauds is 
concerned, is the matter of employment." Id. at 928 (quoting 
Prav v. Anthony, 96 Cal. App. 772, 274 P. 1024, 1029 (1929)). 
The Utah Code itself provides that: 
In the following cases, every agreement 
shall be void unless such agreement, or some 
note or memorandum thereof, is in writing 
subscribed by the party to be charged 
therewith: 
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(5) Every agreement authorizing or 
employing an agent or broker to purchase or 
sell real estate for compensation, 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4 (1989 (prior to 1989 amendment)) 
(emphasis added) . It is clear that the "material parts11 of a 
broker's contract are those terms that employ him. Subsequent 
modification of those terms must be in writing, and subscribed 
by the party to be charged. Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 
669 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 1985). In this instance, however, the 
NAA does not alter terms that "authorize" or "employ." Mr. 
Edmunds was previously authorized to sell the property for a 
commission, and had performed. Rather, the NAA alters the terms 
for compensation and is nothing more than a security agreement. 
These terms are not "material parts" of the original contract 
within the statute of frauds. 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 makes it clear that the purpose of 
the statute of frauds is to protect interests in real property. 
In particular, the purpose of § 25-5-4(5) is "to protect 
property owners from fraudulent and fictitious claims for 
commissions." C J. Realty, Inc., 758 P. 2d at 927 (citing 
Williams v. Singleton, 723 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1986)). In other 
words, because the owner employing the broker has an interest in 
real property, the legislators sought to protect him against 
claims for commission when the brokers were never "authorized" 
or "employed." As the result, the contract that "authorizes" or 
"employs" the broker must be in writing and subscribed by the 
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party to be charged; while the contract involving only the terms 
of commission does not. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated several times that § 25-
5-4(5) does not apply to terms of commission. In Fowler v. 
Taylor, 554 P.2d 205 (Utah 1976), a dispute arose between two 
brokers over the terms of their commissions. The contract 
between the two was oral, and the defendant contended that 
because it was oral, the statute of frauds barred its per-
formance. The court held that it did not. The contract was 
merely an agreement over the terms of commission. 554 P.2d at 
208. 
Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P. 2d 730 (Utah 
1985), involved a situation more analogous to the one presented 
here. In Golden Key, the issue was whether an executory accord 
over the terms of commission was within the statute of frauds. 
The court found that an accord is not within the statute of 
frauds even though the original contract is, unless the accord 
itself is the type of contract within the statute. 699 P.2d at 
732-33. The court held that the modification contract was not 
within the statute, although it altered the terms of commission 
and was between the broker and the landowner. Id. The NAA in 
the instant case similarly was not within the statute of frauds. 
B. Even If The NAA Is Within The Statute Of Frauds, The Broker 
Is Not A "Party to be Charged11 And Need Not Evince Accept-
ance Of The NAA Bv Signature. 
Every contract for the sale of land must be "in writing 
subscribed by the party by whom the lease or sale is to be 
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made," Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 (1989). In other words, the 
party conveying the land must sign the contract to satisfy the 
requirements of the statute. Williams v. Singleton, 723 P.2d 
421, 424 (Utah 1986). This is to protect owners having an 
interest in real property from buyers suing to force sale. 
Buyers, on the other hand, need not sign the contract to make it 
enforceable because they are not "the party to be charged." Id. 
LeVine v. Whitehouse. 37 Utah 260, 109 P. 2 (1910). 
With real estate commissions, the same rule applies. 
Contracts authorizing or employing the broker to sell property 
are within the statute of frauds to protect the landowners 
against fraudulent claims for commission. Fowler v. Taylor, 554 
P.2d 205, 208 (Utah 1976). Landowners have an interest in real 
property that merits the statute's protection. Consequently, 
only the landowner must sign the real estate contract authoriz-
ing and employing the sale to satisfy the requirements of the 
statute. 
Any modification of a contract employing a broker is also 
within the statute of frauds and must be signed by the landowner 
as well. Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas. 699 P.2d 730, 732, 
733 (Utah 1985). Nevertheless, it does not follow that the 
broker must sign a modification to satisfy the statute. 
Modifications must meet the same statutory requirements as the 
original, Strevell-Paterson Co.. Inc. v. Francis. 646 P.2d 741, 
742 (Utah 1982), but no requirement exists for the broker to 
sign the original. Simply because the broker gets a commission 
15 
does not mean that he acquires an interest in land that merits 
the statute's protection. The broker has no such interest. His 
fight is only for a commission, and the statute was not enacted 
for that purpose. See Fowler, 554 P.2d at 208; see also Golden 
Key Realty, 699 P.2d at 732, 733. 
This is not to say that the vendor may unilaterally alter 
the terms of the broker's commission; neither can the vendor 
alter terms of the sale without the vendee's assent. Clearly, 
the broker has rights in the contract and any modification must 
be assented to. The point is that he need not assent by 
signature. The broker is not "a party to be charged" and can 
evince acceptance of a modification as any party would who is 
not a party to be charged. 
In this case, Mr. Edmunds' signature as assignee of the 
Assignment of Contract and as assignor of the Assignment of Note 
(Exhibits 16 and 18, respectively), his receipt of payments 
pursuant to the NAA, and his attempts to claim benefits under 
the NAA obviously manifest his assent to the NAA instrument and 
bind him to its terms. 
C. Even If The NAA Is Within The Statute Of Frauds And Edmunds 
Is A Party To Be Charged, A Sufficient Writing Exists That 
Will Satisfy The Statute. 
Most American jurisdictions agree that " [compliance with 
the Statute of Frauds is not limited to a single, signed piece 
of paper, but may be evidenced by several documents clearly 
related." Knight v. American Nat'l Bank, 756 P.2d 757, 760 
(Wash. App. 1988) . Utah has long accepted this rule. See 
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Miller v. Hancock, 67 Utah 202, 246 P. 949, 951, 952 (1926) 
(several deeds to exchange land satisfied the statute though not 
signed by all parties); Midwest Realty v, City of West Jordan. 
541 P.2d 1109, 1111 (Utah 1975) (city council's minutes contain-
ing the terms and provisions of an agreement satisfied the 
statute); In re Estate of Bonny, 600 P.2d 548, 549, 550 (Utah 
1979) (three receipts which referred to a real estate trans-
action as a "sale," stated the consideration for the sale, 
acknowledged receipt of part payment, referred to "11 acres in 
Alpine," and were subscribed by the seller satisfied the 
statute); Greaerson v, Jensen, 617 P.2d 369, 372, 373 (Utah 
1980) (an unsigned deed that contained the names of the parties 
and a description of the land involved, and a signed check 
referring to the deed, satisfied the statute). 
In Greaerson, the Utah Supreme Court outlined the require-
ments that several writings must meet to satisfy the statute of 
frauds. The court found that several writings may be construed 
together as containing all the terms of a contract, though they 
are not all signed by the party to be charged, provided that 
some nexus between the writings is shown. Greaerson, 617 P.2d 
at 372, 373. This nexus can be shown "either by express 
reference in the signed writing to the unsigned one, or by 
implied reference gleamed [sic] from the contents of the 
writings and the circumstances surrounding the transaction." 
Id. at 373 (emphasis added) . If the reference in the signed 
writing is implied, the writings must "clearly refer to the same 
17 
subject matter or transaction." Id. Moreover, an implied 
reference may be shown by parol evidence. Id. In Gregerson, 
the court found that because there was an implied reference in 
the signed check to the unsigned deed and several express 
references to the contract, including the contents of the deed, 
together with the fact that the bank had custody of the deed 
within a few days after part payment and that the vendor 
acknowledged the propriety of the deed, a sufficient nexus 
between the writings existed, and the writings satisfied the 
statute of frauds. 
In this instance, three writings satisfy the demands of the 
statute. They are: (1) the NAA, granting Interwest a security 
interest in the payments Leon Sprouse received -under his 
contract dated March 29, 1985 (Exhibit 15); (2) the Assignment 
of Contract by which Interwest assigned its rights in the NAA to 
Artie Edmunds (Exhibit 16) ; and (3) the Assignment of Note by 
which Artie Edmunds assigned his rights in the NAA to Draper 
Bank & Trust (Exhibit 18) . Because the NAA and the Assignment 
of Contract are dispositive in this matter, this discussion will 
focus on those two writings.4 
A clear nexus exists between the NAA and the Assignment of 
Contract that satisfies the statute of frauds. The Assignment 
provides that the seller in the contract dated March 29, 1985, 
4However, virtually everything discussed about the nexus 
between the NAA and the Assignment of Contract applies with 
equal force to the nexus between the NAA and the Assignment of 
Note. 
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"has conveyed to Interwest Commercial Properties a security 
interest of $25,000.00 as set forth in the attached note agree-
ment dated April 1, 1985." (Exhibit 16.) Leon Sprouse is the 
seller referred to. The NAA is the only note agreement by 
which, on April 1, 1985, Leon Sprouse granted to Interwest a 
$25,000.00 security interest in his contract. The Assignment 
can have reference to no other writing but the NAA. Moreover, 
the NAA was attached to the Assignment and was dated the day 
before the Assignment. 
Without question, the Assignment refers to the NAA. The 
Assignment was signed by Interwest, the secured party in the 
NAA, and by Mr. Watson, the owner of Interwest. The Assignment 
is a signed writing with an "express reference" to the unsigned 
NAA, and these two writings, taken together, satisfy the statute 
of frauds. See Gregerson, 617 P.2d at 373. These two writings 
plainly show that the NAA modifies Leon Sprousefs original 
contract to employ Interwest or Mr. Edmunds as contained in the 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement and that enforcement of the NAA is 
not barred by the statute of frauds. 
POINT II 
THE GREAT WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED 
THAT EDMUNDS CONSENTED TO THE MODIFICATION 
OF THE REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AGREEMENT. 
The trial court found that "defendant has failed to meet 
his burden of proof on his claim that there was a written or 
oral modification of his obligation to pay a commission . . . ." 
(Findings, para. 8, (R. vol. Ill, p. 149).) This finding should 
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be reversed by this court because it is contrary to the great 
weight of the evidence. In re Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 
886 (Utah 1989). 
Sprouse testified at trial that Edmunds had agreed, prior 
to the execution of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement on March 
11, 1985, that payment of the $25,000.00 commission would be 
contingent upon receiving payments from the buyers, Jager. This 
testimony was corroborated by the only independent witness, 
James Ivins, who prepared the documents which were signed at the 
closing of the transaction. Mr. Ivins testified that Edmunds 
had instructed him that payment of the commission was contingent 
upon receiving payments from Jager, and that Sprouse was to have 
no personal liability for payment of the commission. Ivins 
testified that he prepared the NAA to reflect that agreement. 
Edmunds and his principal broker accepted the NAA, and the 
principal broker assigned it to Edmunds on April 2, 1985. On 
April 24, 1985, Edmunds assigned the NAA to Draper Bank & Trust 
as security for a loan. 
Shortly after this action was commenced, Edmunds filed an 
affidavit claiming rights in the subject property by virtue of 
the NAA. (R. vol. I, pp. 47-50.) Edmunds thereafter filed his 
Answer to Second Amended Complaint; Counterclaim Against 
Plaintiff and Cross-Claim Against Jagers. (R. vol. I, pp. 126-
34, copy attached as Appendix G.) Edmunds therein claimed an 
interest in the real property under the NAA, and counterclaimed 
against Sprouse to assert that interest. He also cross-claimed 
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against Jager seeking foreclosure and a deficiency judgment in 
the event the proceeds of foreclosure were insufficient to 
satisfy Edmunds' claim. Most notably, he did not pray for a 
money judgment against Sprouse on the real estate commission. 
This apparently deliberate acknowledgement of no right to a 
money judgment against Sprouse continued through the pre-trial 
order. (R. vol. I, pp. 154-63.) It was not until after Sprouse 
filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that Edmunds1 
right to recover the commission had terminated by Jager's 
default (R. vol. I, pp. 180-81, 217-33), that Edmunds first 
asserted that the NAA was not binding and enforceable and that 
Sprouse was personally obligated to pay the commission. (R. 
vol. I, pp. 236-40, 241-50.) 
Edmunds1 principal broker, Roy Larsen, testified that he 
understood that the brokerage had agreed to take a note for the 
payment of the commission with deferred payments (Tr. 25) , and 
that the note (the NAA) was subsequently assigned in full to 
Edmunds (Tr. 27) . Edmunds, who was the only representative of 
the brokerage who attended the closing, testified that payment 
of the commission was not provided for in the settlement 
statement, because it would be paid under a note. (Tr. 110.) 
That note was the NAA. (Tr. 121.) 
In summary, all of the evidence at trial established that 
Edmunds and his broker had treated the obligation to pay the 
commission has being contained solely in the NAA, and had 
accepted the NAA and the benefits received under it. The only 
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contrary testimony was the self-serving testimony of the 
principal broker, who testified that he had not agreed to any 
modification of the commission agreement. (Tr. 26.) He further 
testified, however, that a week or two after closing he became 
aware of the provision in the NAA which states that Sprouse was 
not personally obligated to pay the real estate commission, and 
stated that he discussed that provision with Mr. Edmunds at that 
time. (Tr. 27.) Edmunds denied that he had ever heard of that 
provision until after the litigation was commenced. (Tr. 119-
20.) 
The only other evidence offered against the enforceability 
of the NAA was the self-serving testimony of Mr. Edmunds, who 
acknowledged receiving the NAA and assigning it to his bank as 
security for a loan, but who claimed he was not aware of the 
provision limiting Sprouse's personal liability and that he did 
not agree to any such provision. 
Where all the evidence showed that both Edmunds and his 
principal broker had accepted the NAA and that all their acts, 
until well after the commencement of this litigation, were in 
accordance with the proposition that Sprouse was not personally 
liable for payment of the commission, and where the only 
independent testimony established that Edmunds had specifically 
dictated the terms of the NAA and had agreed to them, the trial 
court's finding that Sprouse failed to carry his burden of proof 
of showing consent to the modification was clearly erroneous. 
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Sprouse is aware of the numerous decisions which hold that 
the findings of the trial court on disputed issues of fact will 
not be reversed unless clearly erroneous, and that great 
deference is given to the trial court's ability to assess the 
credibility of the witnesses. The Utah Supreme Court has also 
frequently stated, however, that self-serving statements of a 
witness are entitled to little weight, particularly where the 
witness's actions contradict his statements. For example, in 
First Security Bank of Utah v. Shiew, 609 P.2d 952 (Utah 1980), 
the Court addressed the question of whether an after-acquired 
property clause, or dragnet clause, in a mortgage agreement 
executed by Shiew in Monticello, Utah, also operated to secure a 
subsequent loan obtain by Shiew from the bank in Price, Utah. 
The Court established that one of the factors in determining 
whether the dragnet clause was enforceable was whether the bank 
had relied on the security in extending the loan. 609 P.2d at 
957. The bank officer who prepared the Price loan testified 
that he was aware of the Monticello loan and was aware of the 
dragnet clause in the mortgage and relied on the Monticello 
property as constituting additional security for the Price loan. 
(609 P.2d at 958-59) (Hall, J., dissenting). A majority of the 
Court nonetheless held that "[t]he self-serving statements of 
the bank officer" were "of no evidentiary value." 609 P.2d at 
957. 
Of similar effect is Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. 
Harman, 17 Utah 2d 420, 413 P.2d 807 (1966). The plaintiff in 
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that case sought to overcome the presumption of delivery of 
certain deeds which he had previously executed in favor of his 
children, and which he claimed where intended to be effective 
only upon his death. The Supreme Court affirmed summary 
judgment against the plaintiff, notwithstanding his clear 
testimony concerning his intentions, stating that his "testimony 
that he did not intend title to pass prior to his death is self-
serving and inconsistent with his actions." 413 P.2d at 810. 
See also Pollesche v. K-Mart Enterprises of Utah, Inc., 520 P.2d 
200, 203 (Utah 1974) (judgment of dismissal in jury action at 
close of plaintiff's evidence affirmed notwithstanding the 
plaintifffs testimony, because the testimony was self-serving). 
The trial court's reliance in the instant case on the self-
serving statements of Edmunds and his principal broker, to the 
exclusion of all the other evidence, including the only 
independent testimony, was clearly erroneous. The evidence 
established as a matter of law that Edmunds accepted the NAA, 
and was bound by all provisions of it. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENFORCING PORTIONS OF THE 
NAA WHILE HOLDING OTHER PORTIONS UNENFORCEABLE. 
The trial court's ruling in this case permitted Edmunds to 
have his cake and eat it too. The trial court held that Edmunds 
was not bound by the provision of the NAA which eliminated the 
personal liability of Sprouse, yet held that Edmunds was 
entitled to recover benefits under the other portions of the 
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NAA, specifically those relating to a lien on the subject 
premises, provisions relating to interest, and provisions 
relating to attorney fees. This legal conclusion should be 
reviewed by this court on a correctness standard with no 
deference to the trial court. 
The NAA was clearly an "entire," as opposed to "severable," 
contract. The distinction between the two depends on the intent 
of the parties: 
A contract is severable or entire 
depending on the intent of the parties at 
the time they entered into the contract. 
This intent should be 
ascertained first from the four 
corners of the instrument itself, 
second from other contemporaneous 
writings concerning the same 
subject matter, and third from the 
extrinsic parol evidence of the 
intentions. 
Management Services Corp. v. Development Associates, 617 P.2d 
406, 408 (Utah 1980) (citations omitted). 
The four corners of the NAA will admit of no other con-
clusion but that it was an "entire" contract. Nothing in the 
contemporaneous writings would alter that conclusion, and it is 
further supported by the extrinsic parol evidence. Sprouse 
testified, and there was no contrary evidence, that his 
acceptance of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement and his 
execution of the NAA was contingent upon the understanding that 
he would not be personally liable for the sales commission. 
(Tr. 179.) 
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Because the contract was entire, severable enforcement was 
improper. Either the whole contract must be enforced, or no 
portion of it. 
The trial court's award of 12% pre-judgment interest is 
supported only by the NAA. Sprouse argues that the NAA should 
be binding in all respects. If this Court holds that it is not 
binding, however, it follows that the interest at 12% must be 
reversed. Absent the provisions of the NAA, the maximum 
interest which may be charged is 10%. Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-
1(2) (Supp. 1989).5 
Edmunds1 claim of a lien on the motel and to an entitlement 
to the proceeds of the foreclosure is similarly based solely on 
the NAA. Sprouse disputes Edmunds1 claim to an interest in the 
proceeds of foreclosure, because there were no such proceeds. 
Sprouse purchased the property at the foreclosure sale by a 
credit bid, i.e., the bid of $360,000.00 was credited against 
Jager's obligation to Sprouse, and reduced the obligation by 
that amount. No cash was paid. It follows that there was no 
proceeds upon which a lien could attach. In any event, however, 
the right to a lien arises only out of the NAA. The Court's 
judgment providing for a lien is an error for the reasons 
discussed above. 
5
 The 12% interest rate provided in Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-
4 (1989) applies only to judgments other than on a contract. 
Judgments on contracts bear interest at the rate specified in 
the contract. Where no interest rate was specified, it follows 
that the statutory rate of 10% would apply both before and after 
judgment. 
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Finally, the Courtfs award of attorney fees is grounded 
only in the NAA.6 The entire award of attorney fees must be 
vacated. 
POINT IV 
THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES IS NOT SUPPORTED 
BY THE EVIDENCE. 
The Trial Court awarded judgment against Sprouse for 
$9,000*00 for attorney fees. The entire text of the testimony 
relating to attorney fees is set forth in Appendix H. Notably 
lacking is any testimony as to the reasonableness of the fees. 
Even if the fees were determined to be reasonable, the evidence 
established that Edmunds was entitled to recover, at most, a fee 
of only $3,000.00. In addition, the previous point establishes 
that there was no contractual basis for an award of any attorney 
fees. 
MAn award of attorney fees must be based on evidence in the 
record which supports the award." Regional Sales Agency v. 
Reichert, 122 Utah Adv. Rep, 46, 49 (Utah Ct. App. Nov. 24, 
1989). This requirement is not satisfied by merely testifying 
as to the number of hours spent. In Talley v. Talley, 739 P.2d 
83 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), for example, this Court reversed an 
award of attorney fees where no evidence of reasonableness was 
presented: 
6
 The findings also assert that the award of attorney's 
fee is based on a provision of the Earnest Money Sales Agree-
ment. The copy of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement admitted 
into evidence, however, does not contain any provision relating 
to attorney fees. (Exhibit 2.) 
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At the close of plaintiff's case, her 
counsel proffered testimony and produced an 
exhibit itemizing the time and costs 
expended by him, his associate, and his 
clerk, and the hourly rates charged for 
each. Conspicuously absent is any evidence 
"regarding the necessity of the number of 
hours dedicated, the reasonableness of the 
rate charged in light of the difficulty of 
the case and the result accomplished, and 
the rates commonly charged for divorce 
actions in the community . . . .w Kerr v. 
Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1384-85 (Utah 1980). 
739 P.2d at 84. The Court in Talley accordingly reversed the 
award of attorney fees. 
Although Talley dealt with a divorce case, the same prin-
ciples apply to all cases where an award of attorney fees is 
sought. Regional Sales Agency, supra. The evidence in this 
case is wholly insufficient to support a finding of reasonable-
ness. The entire award must therefore be reversed. 
Even if this Court were to determine that the evidence was 
sufficient to justify the award of some attorney fees, the 
evidence clearly does not justify the award of a fee of 
$9,000.00. A party is entitled to recover attorney fees only on 
the issue on which is prevailed. Mountain States Broadcasting 
Co. v. Neale, 776 P.2d 643, 649 n. 10 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), 
rehearing denied, 113 Utah Adv. Rep. 41 (Ct. App. July 20, 
1989) . 
Edmunds1 attorney testified at trial that only one-third of 
his time, or $3,000.00, was spent in pursuing recovering on the 
promissory note (the NAA), the issue upon which Edmunds 
28 
ultimately prevailed. The balance of the award must be 
disallowed in any event. 
CONCLUSION 
The Note/Agreement/Assignment executed by Sprouse was 
accepted, as a matter of law, by Edmunds, both by his signature 
to other documents executed as part of the same transactions, 
and by his subsequent assignment of and reliance on the agree-
ment. This case should be remanded with instructions to dismiss 
the complaint against Sprouse. 
In the alternative, the case should be remanded with 
instructions to vacate the award of interest at 12%, to vacate 
the attorney fees, and to vacate the judgment granting Edmunds a 
lien on the proceeds of the foreclosure sale. As a final 
alternative, the attorney fees award should be reduced to 
$3,000.00. 
DATED this 8th day of January, 1989. 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: // 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN^ 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH 
LEON SPF.OUSE, ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ARJEN W. JAGER, NADA H. JAGER, 
ARTIE EDMUNDS, LLOYD WALTERS, ] 
and JOHN DOES I throgh V, ] 
Defendants. 
ROY N. LARSEN, ARTIE EDMUNDS, ] 
and INTERWEST COMMERCIAL ] 
PROPERTIES, ] 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
LEON SPROUSE, ] 
Third-Party Defendant. ) 
• REINSTATED 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
i JULY 11, 1989 NUNC 
PRO TUNC FOR 
1 NOVEMBER 9, 1988 
i Civil No. 86-0982 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
on July 1, 1988 on the third-party plaintiffs1 (hereinafter 
referred to as plaintiffs) complaint against third-party 
defendant (hereinafter referred to as defendant) and on the 
counterclaim said defendant filed against plaintiffs, the 
pleadings having been properly joined. Plaintiffs appeared with 
their attorney, John L. Miles, and presented evidence, testimony 
and witnesses in their behalf, and defendant Leon Sprouse 
appeared with his attorneyr R. Clayton Huntsman, and presented 
evidence, testimony and witnesses in his behalf. The matter was 
fully tried tp the Court, the Honorable J. Philip Eves, District 
Court Judge, presiding. At the conclusion of the trial, both 
parties having rested, the Court requested counsel for both 
parties to submit simultaneous memoranda on July 18, 1988 on 
one legal issue and to also submit any closing argument in 
writing at the same time. The parties having filed their 
memoranda and closing arguments, and the Court having heard the 
evidence and testimony at trial, and having reviewed the 
memoranda and written closing arguments, and good cause 
appearing, now makes and enters its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That this Court has jurisdiction of the parties and 
of the subject matter in this action and that venue is 
appropriate before this Court. The Court finds that plaintiff 
Roy N. Larsen is, and was at all material times herein, a 
licensed Utah real estate broker, and is entitled to bring this 
action for the recovery of the commission sought in this case. 
2. The Court finds that defendant entered into a valid 
and binding agreement to pay a real estate commission of 
$25,0 00.0 0 when defendant executed the Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement (Trial Exhibit P-2) on March 11, 1985, in which 
defendant accepted the offer of Argen Jager to purchase his Oasis 
Motel property. 
3. The Court finds that, by the explicit language 
contained in the section of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement 
titled AGREEMENT TO PAY REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, that defendant 
agreed to pay the $25,000.00 commission at the time of closing. 
4. The Court finds that the closing on defendant's 
sale of the Oasis Motel to Argen Jager was held and completed on 
March 29, 1985 in St. George, Utah, and that Argen Jager took 
pos&^ssion of the Oasis Motel and made monthly payments to 
defendant for 13 months before defaulting by failing to make the 
payment due June 1, 1986. 
5. The Court finds that plaintiffs had procured a 
buyer who was ready, willing, and able and who was accepted by 
defendant and .that the commission was fully earned and due at 
said closing on March 29, 1985. 
6. The Court finds that none of the commission was 
paid at the closing because there were no funds available at 
closing as defendant had agreed to accept equity in traded 
properties as Argen Jager1s $85,000.00 down payment. 
7. The Court finds that plaintiffs, at defendant's 
request, orally consented to a deferred payment of the commission 
merely to accommodate the defendant by providing a convenient 
mode or method of payment, as the funds to pay the commission 
were not available at the closing. The Court finds that this 
oral arrangement only changed the time of payment and did not 
change or alter defendant's obligation to pay the commission. 
The Court further finds that defendant, but not plaintiffs, 
signed Trial Exhibit P-15, a "NOTE/AGREEMENT/ASSIGNMENT". The 
Court finds that the "note" and "assignment" portions of Trial 
Exhibit P-15 is binding en defendant and obligates defendant to 
pay twelve (12%) percent interest on the commission and costs and 
expenses of collection, including a reasonable attorney's fee, 
and secures those obligations by a partial assignment of the 
Arjen Jager Uniform Real Estate Contract. The Court_ finds that 
Trial Exhibit P-15 is not binding on plaintiffs, specifically the 
"agreement" portion, as it was not signed by plaintiffs, nor does 
the Court find that plaintiffs orally agreed to the "agreement" 
portion, as set out in the second to last paragraph. 
8. The Court finds that defendant has failed to meet 
his burden of proof on his claim that there was a written or oral 
modification of his obligation to pay a commission, which 
modification defendant contends would release or excuse him from 
further payments on the commission obligation if Mr. Jager 
defaulted. The Court further finds that defendant has failed to 
meetiiis burden of proof on his claim that plaintiffs' acceptance 
of 13 monthly payments was either part performance of such a 
modified written or oral agreement or a waiver of plaintiffs' 
claim for the commission. The Court finds that plaintiffs' 
acceptance of 13 monthly payments were not acts that were 
exclusively referable to any modification of the commission 
agreement, but that accepting such payments was consistent with 
defendant's obligation to pay the commission in deferred payments 
as set forth in the "note" portion of Trial Exhibit P-15. The 
acceptance of such payments is therefore not evidence of nor part 
performance of the "agreement" portion of Trial Exhibit P-15. 
9. The Court finds that plaintiffs and defendant did 
not enter into any written or oral agreement that: would modify or 
alter defendant's agreement and obligation to pay the $25,000.00 
commission. 
10. The Court finds that the balance due as of July 1, 
1988 on defendants obligation to pay a $25,000.00 commission, 
after giving credit for the 13 monthly payments received, is 
$24,239.46. 
11. The Court finds that plaintiffs are entitled to a 
judgment for said balance of $24,239.46, and that the judgment 
should carry interest at the rate of twelve (12%) percent per 
annum from July 1, 19 88 until paid. 
12. The Court finds that the Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement (Trial Exhibit P-2) provides in paragraph B of its 
General Provisions that any defaulting party is obligated to pay 
all costs and expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee, 
which may arise from enforcing the agreement, and that defendant 
is therefore obligated to pay plaintiffs' reasonable attorney's 
fees. In addition, as independent grounds for the recovery of 
attorney's fees, the Court finds that Trial Exhibit P-15 
obligates defendant to pay all costs and expenses of collection, 
including a reasonable attorney's fee, if defendant defaulted on 
his agreement to pay the commission in monthly installments. The 
Court finds that defendant did default on the payments required 
by Trial Exhibit P-15, and that plaintiffs are therefore entitled 
to recover their costs and a reasonable attorney's fee. 
13. The Court finds that a reasonable attorney's fee 
in this matter is $9,000.00, based upon evidence that plaintiffs' 
attorney devoted in excess of 150 hours at an hourly rate of 
$60.00 per hour, which rate the Court finds reasonable. 
14- . The Court finds that defendant gave plaintiffs an 
assignment of a $25,000.00 interest in the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract (Trial Exhibit P-3) when defendant signed Trial Exhibit 
P-15. The Court further finds that plaintiffs are therefore 
entitled to share in the proceeds from the sheriff's sale of the 
Oasis Motel, which the Court finds was held on December 10, 1987, 
at which the Oasis Motel property was sold to defendant as the 
highest bidder for the bid of $360,000.00. 
15. The Court finds, on the defendant's counterclaims, 
that defendant has failed to meet his burden of proof by clear 
and convincing evidence that plaintiffs made any material false 
or misleading statements or representations in connection with 
the sale of the Oasis Motel to Argen Jager or that defendant 
justifiably relied thereon to his detriment. Further, the Court 
finds that plaintiffs did not negligently make any false 
representations in this matter, nor has defendant shown any 
evidence that plaintiffs breached any contract or agreement or 
their fiduciary duty to defendant. Therefore, the Court finds 
that the counterclaims of the defendant are without merit and 
should be dismissed with prejudice and on the merits. 
16. The Court finds that a judgment was previously 
signed and entered in this matter on November 5, 1987 in favor of 
defendant and against Arjen W. Jager in the amount of 
$472,473.40. The Court finds that this judgment includes the 
commission which defendant now seeks to avoid. The Court finds 
defendant's positions inconsistent, and finds that by obtaining 
a judgment against Mr. Jager that includes the commission, 
defendant has acknowledged his own liability for the commission, 
and that this constitutes independent grounds in support of the 
above findings that defendant is liable for the commission. 
17. The Court finds that the defendant and plaintiffs, 
by arranging to pay the commission with monthly payments over a 
four year period as provided in Trial Exhibit P-15 and as shown 
by Trial Exhibit P-20, manifested their intent that the 
commission should be paid in full long before the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract with Mr. Jager (Trial Exhibit P-3) was paid in 
full. The Court finds that the parties intended that the 
commission would be fully paid by the time the Jager contract 
balance was approximately $375,000.00 as shown by Trial Exhibit 
P-22. The Court finds that defendant gave plaintiffs a partial 
assignment of a $25,000.00 interest in the Jager contract to 
secure the payment of the commission (see finding 7 above). The 
Court finds that under these circumstances where the intent was 
to pay the commission first, it is equitable to apply the 
$360,000.00 proceeds of the Sheriff1s sale first to the 
commission, and the balance to the retained interest of 
defendant. The Court finds that the assignment and Sheriff's 
sale constitute independent grounds for plaintiffs' recovery of a 
commission from defendant. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court concludes that it has jurisdiction of the 
parties and of the subject matter and that venue is proper. 
2. The Court concludes that UCA §25-5-4(5) requires a 
real estate commission agreement to be in writing. 
3. The Court concludes that Trial Exhibit P-2 (Earnest 
Money Sales Agreement) contains an enforceable written agreement 
obligating defendant to pay plaintiffs a $25,000^00 commission. 
4. The Court concludes that when a commission 
agreement is required by law to be in writing, that any 
alteration or modification thereof must also be in writing and 
signed by the party, plaintiffs in this case, to be charged with 
the modified agreement. The Court concludes that there is no 
evidence of any written modification which has been signed by 
plaintiffs. 
5. The Court concludes that before the doctrine of 
part performance can take an alleged oral modification of a 
commission agreement out of the statute of frauds, the part 
performance must consist of sufficient acts that are exclusively 
referable to the oral agreement. The Court concludes that 
defendant has failed to meet his burden by showing any acts of 
part performance that are exclusively referable to the alleged 
oral modification that would excuse payment of the commission if 
Mr. Jager defaulted. 
6. The Court concludes that there was no written or 
oral modification of defendant's obligation to pay a $25,000.00 
commission, but only an agreement to provide a convenient mode or 
jk *~r> 
method for deferred payment. 
7. fhe Court concludes that plaintiffs are entitled to 
judgment in the principal sum of $24,239.46 on the commission 
agreement and notef and the Court awards plaintiffs attorney's 
fees of $9,000.00, for a total judgment of $33,239.46, said 
judgment to bear interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per 
annum from July If 1988 until paid. 
8. "The Court concludes that the plaintiffs are 
entitled by law to file their memorandum of costs, and that such 
costs shall be included as part of the judgment. 
9. 'the Court concludes that defendant's counterclaims 
against plaintiffs should be dismissed with prejudice and on the 
merits. ^p 
DATED this [Z- ^ day of July, 1989. 
&J PHILIP E^ES 
district Court Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 11th day of July, 1989, I 
served an unsigned copy of the above and foregoing Reinstated 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Fred D. Howard, 
attorney for Leon Sprouse, by depositing a copy in the United 
States mail, first-class postage prepaid, addressed to Fred D. 
Howard, 120 Ea£t 300 North, P.O. Box 778, Provo, Utah 84603. 
APPENDIX "B" 
Reinstated Judgment 
FI! :7coo* f 
• :OUNTY 
WRIGHT & MILES 
By: John L. Miles 
A t t o r n e y s f o r T h i r d - P a r t y P l a i n t i f f s 
60 N o r t h 300 E a s t CLEAA . 
S t . G e o r g e , Utah 84770 DEPUTY 
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 628-2612 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AMD FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH 
LEON SPRCUSE, 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. 
APJEN W. JAGER, NADA H. JAGER, 
ARTIE EDMUNDS, LLOYD WALTERS, 
and JOHN DOES I through V, 
Defendants. 
ROY N. LARSEN, ARTIE EDMUNDS, 
and INTERWEST COMMERCIAL 
PROPERTIES, 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, ' 
vs. : 
LEON SPROUSE, 
Third-Party Defendant. ' 
i REINSTATED 
i JUDGMENT 
JULY 11, 1989 NUNC 
I PRO TUNC FOR 
1 NOVEMBER 9, 1988 
1 Civil No. 86-0982 
This matter having come on for trial on July 1, 1988 on 
third-party plaintiffs1 (hereinafter referred to as plaintiffs) 
complaint against third-party defendant Leon Sprouse and on the 
counterclaim filed by Mr. Sprouse against plaintiffs, with 
plaintiffs appearing with their attorney, John L. Miles, and 
Mr. *Sprouse appearing with his attorney, R. Clayton Huntsman, and 
the pleadings being properly joined, and the Court having heard 
the testimony of the witnesses and considered the evidence 
presented, and the matter having been fully tried to the Court, 
and the Court having made its Revised Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. That the counterclaims of defendant Leon Sprouse 
against third-party plaintiffs are hereby dismissed with 
/v 
prejudice and on the merits. 
2. That the.third-party plaintiffs Roy H. Larsen, 
Artie Edmunds, and Interwest Commercial Properties have judgment 
against defendant Leon Sprouse in the amount of $33,239.46, plus 
costs of Court. 
3. That this judgment bears interest at the judgment 
rate of twelve (12%) percent per annum from July 1, 1988 until 
paid as provided by law. 
DATED this /^H^day of July, 1989. 
m j 
PHILIP EVj 
strict Court Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 11th day of July, 1989, I 
served an unsigned copy of the above and foregoing Reinstated 
Judgment on Fred D. Howard, attorney for Leon Sprouse, by 
depositing a copy in the United States mail, first-class postage 
prepaid, addressed to Fred D. Howard, 120 East 300 North, P.O. 
Box 778, Provo, Utah 84603. 
APPENDIX "C 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement (Exhibit 2) 
The undersigned Buyer. 
- A i l T ^ - S l MUiNJil 5AJLJb5 AlrKiiiUVlJUNT 
Legend Yes(X) No(0) 
This is a legally binding contract. Read both front and back carefully before signing. 
EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT 
DATE: 
 / / 
as EARNEST MONEY, the amount oi r = 
Dollars ($_ — ), in the form of <— 
which shell be deposited in accordance with applicable State Law. 
Agent/Broker Company 
hereby deposits with Agent/Broker Company 
Received by: frj,\u7'' £,<rb*m^ffr^ 
OFFER TO PURCHASE 
SSCRIPJION The abovistated EARNEST MONEY isxjiven to secure and apply on the purchase of the property si 
L f fcja^yf ML* is in the City of >&' fXieA^t. County of (A Jr{JL^. *~..n 
a covenants,J4oning regulations, utility or other easements or nghts^ of way^overnment patentypr state deeds of 
1. PROPERTY DES 
at Z£J UL 
subject to any restrictive 
approved by Buyer in accordance with Section 4. Said property is more particularly described as: 
ituated 
. Utah, 
record 
CHECK APPLICABLE BOXES: 
> B IMPROVED REAL PROPERTY (Jfc-Commercial U Residential Q Other 
D UNIMPROVED REAL PROPERTY • Vacant Lot Q Vacant Acreege • Other 
(a) Included items. Unless excluded below, this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the following items if presently anached to the 
property: plumbing, heating, air-conditioning and ventilating fixtures and equipment water heater, built-in appliances, light fixtures and 
bulbs, bathroom fixtures, curtains and draperies and rods, window and door screens, storm doors, window blinds, awnings, installed 
television antenna, wall-to-wail carpets, water softener, automatic garage door opener and transmitter(s), fencing, trees and shrubs. The 
foffovfing pe/isonaf property shall aisoLbe included in this sate and conveyed under separate BUkpf ?afe witfc warranties ps$o title: ll w r l i isn. e included in this sale and conveyed under sep rate BUkpi Sale with warrantiesas to 
JULL UdiMm^ fL<\JMi*IA<
 1)^4= AiUfM-Uu jChl^f flU*X£Hd*<t _ t t rTWTZ/ 
(b| Excluded Items. The following itdms are specif icairy excluded from this sale: AJ«J -* J^ •_ *> •",J rM **» 
(c) Connections:'' Seller represents that the above property is connected to: 
X& public sewer; O septic tank;vQmunicipal water; Dwell; Q netural gas; D irrigation water/secondary system; D other sanitary system 
(specify) _ 1 £ 
(d) Utilities. Improvements, and Other Rights. The property presently has or is served by the following: 
Gfepublic water main; O well; O water stub in; CTsewer main; O private water main; Q gas main; & electric distribution line; Q gas 
aistributionlinerQ? telephone; D ingress and egress by private easement; ,23 dedicated road; pcrope;A0sidewalk;,Bcurb& gutter D water 
rights, specify •' • mineral rights, specify ;. D other, specify 
(e) Survey. A certified survey D shall be furnished at the expense of 
prior to Closing; ^Hh'all not be furnished. 
(f) Buyer Inspection. Buyer has made a visua^  insp 
condition, except: "' ft^:tt' M J M ^ ^ T ^ - ^ ' 
inspection of the property and subject to Section (d) above accepts it in its present physical 
/ i PURCHASE PRIGS AND FINANCING. The total 
— f t -
 t<n> 
purchase price for the property is </*uxv ^i^^JLz^U flfWl^r"J" 
Dollars {• JO.T i /Dr ) &- ) which shall be paid as follows: 
.which represents the eforedescribed EARNEST MONEY DEPOSIT: 
'representing the approximate balance of CASH DOWN PAYMENT at closing. 
representing the approximate balance of an existing mortgage, trust deed note* real estate contract or other encumbrance to be 
• assumed by Buyer, which obligation bears interest at _ _ _ _ % per annum with monthly payments of * 
which includes:, j Q-principal; Q interest;. Q taxes; D insurance. 
representing the approximate balance of an additional existing mortgage, trust deed note, reel estate contract or other 
encumbrance to be assumed by Buyer, which obligation bears interest at * ger annum with monthly payments of 
$ whteh JnHnH—- Q principal; O interest;' D taxes; D insurance. 
* . ^ j g l C V f ) ' represe hting balance, if any. Including refinancing, to be paid as follows^ LlxJf. 
l ^ g j j f a .PURC <hi.' f' Jc^cfeJ 
If outside financing is required. Buyer agrees to use best efforts to procure seme end this offer is mede subject to Buyer qualifying for and lending 
institution granting said loan. Buyer agrees to make application for said loan within _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ days after Seller's acceptance 
of this Agreement at an interest rate not to exceed __%. Buyer further agrees to obtain a written commitment for said loan, and if the 
commitment is not obtained within a reasonable time, this Agreement is voidable et the option of Seller. 
amount of purchase price O an abstract of title brought current, with an attorney's opinion (See Paragraph I). 
• 4. INSPECTION OF TtTLE. W t h i n _ l £ L -days after acceptance of this offer, Sailer shall provide Buyerwjth either a commitment for title 
insurance or an abstract of title brought current with an attorney's opinion. Buyer shall have a period of ! _ ^ _ d a y s after receipt thereof to 
examine and accept. If Buyer does not accept. Buyer shall mail written notice thereof, by certified mail, return receipt requested, within the prescribed 
time period! Thereafter, Seller shall be required, through escrow at closing, to cure the defect(s) to which Buyer has objected. If said defectfsl rs not 
curable through an escrow agreement at closing* this Agreement shall be null and void at the option of the Buyer, and all monies received herewith 
shall be returned to the respective parties. 
5. •> VESTING OF TITLE. • Title shall vest in Buyer as follows: - Jrs y t ^ / W V N h\f h)\, v **r witTi*-
6. SELLER WARRANTIES. Seller warrants that: (a) Seller has received no claim nor notice of any building or zoning violation concerning the 
property which has not or will not be remedied prior to closing; (b) ail obligations against the property including taxes, assessments, mortgages, liens or 
other encumbrances.of any nature shall be brought current on or before closing; and (c) the plumbing,,heating, air conditioning and ventilating 
systems, electrical system, and appliances shall be sound or in satisfactory working condition at closing. Exceptions to the above shall be limited to the 
following:' j \T>
 xjjiJ*'fifktm*\ a"' 1 '. 
7. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONTINGENCIES.. This offer is made_subject teethe following special conditions and/o& 
contingencies which must be satisfied prior ie closing: . lALJ+jLyl . .r^. , V / J ^ — J -.. ^ w t / u ^ J ^ / ^ " j f ' C u v v ^ -''^nfTt(r-
™<£f' ' jpxytu^^ < ' ft7f " , - "TT7 ~—rys 
8. CLOSING Or SALE. This Agreement shall be closed on or before l1*1- \ L 19-fcS-at a reasonable location to be designated 
by Seller, subject to Paragraph K on the reverse side hereof. Upon demend. Buyer and Seller shall deposit with the Escrow Closing Office all documents 
necessary to complete the purchase in accordance with this Agreement. Prorations set forth in Paragraph L on reverse side, shair be made as 
of CX^ date of possession Q date of closing a other , _ _ 
9. POSSESSION. Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer on •. — unless extended by mutual agreement of parties. 
10. GENERAL PROVISIONS. Unless otherwise indicated above, the General Provisions on the reverse side hereof are incorporated into this 
Agreement by reference. 
11. AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE ANO TIME UNNTFOR^ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the property on the above terms and 
conditions. Seller shall have until H' Gb ffifr/PM) , /H«»A^>* } 3 I Q ^^Im»r.r»ptthi*nH*r Unless accepted, this offer shall lapse and 
the Agent shall return the EARNEST MONErnfthe Buyer. 
DATE 3 ""' 7 ' % T SIGNATURE OF BUYER O 
/ ts<? 
CHECK ONE 
ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE-
w/4% slier hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified above. 
COUNTER OFFER 
O Seller hereby accepts the foregoing offer SUBJECT TO the exceptions or modifications or specified In the attached Addendum and presents saic 
COUNTER OFFER for Buyer's acceptance. 
DATE J? ft*'/t' ^ SIGNATURE^ SELLER 
TIME (? !JQ CJAM^M) £^Z&<*l<-< C^>?^ 
REJECTION 
O Seller hereby REJECTS the foregoing offer. (Seller's Initials) 
AGREEMENT TO PAY REAL ESTATE COMMISSION 
CHECK ONE 
O This property is listed by _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Listing Agent/Broker Compam. 
and a real estate commission shall be paid in accordance with the Sales Agency Agreement The Selling Agent/Broker Company is 
o/ /y*%tf1 C^JKSH.JC^ "" ^foJtifttiirLi? (j(/Y*\nrriil*itonS r r t ^ y V t T u ^ > Ustingand Sealing Agent/Brcjcer Compan 
has been authorized to offer this property for sale and Seller agrees to pay a real estate commission of l£j JB. J \lS} £W. ) aTconsideratio 
for its efforts in procuring Buyer. Said commission shall be payable at closing or' 
amount or due date thereof cannot be changed without the prior consent of the 
DATE 3 m ,f - 8 ^ SIGHAPJRBJSF SELLER 
.f*1<L/ 
This form has been approved by the Utah Real Estate Commission. 
FORM 123 — Long Gem Printing Co. Salt Lake City. Utah* 
ADDENDUM TO 
EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT 
O * ATTACHMENT 
(Check 8ox) 
Reference is made to EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT dated . 
Q COUNTEH OFFER 
9 i   t   i 
pertainir q to the property situated at 
en ? 
. City L\ M a f t . .•.•/«, 
(Buyer) and fCl / y < ^y_t t^y. i $ 
f /J, ,£4- £.gi~w ~gLXJ 
19. . . between 
— (Seller) 
7 * County. State of Utah. 
Accaptance of the attached offer is contingent upon rrlutuai agreement to the following modified or additional terms and/or conditio?"? which, uoon 
acceptance, shall be deemed incorporated in the offer previously set forth and shall control the terms of said instrument. 
' *
 j y {.LTY\,LL 
ML 
f*l .iXtd 
fl,ft/_;Wv*_U £ rfwVj 
/ ^ . A / U 
I f~^< f 
^VN Qrv\ -£w»^/fc * TcA J lAJIsJt^ft 
ct—-U-W-! CUALW 
^ £ . A<H **g —f> -&X. QVuu&L 
4*i-
vCvsl 
JXJJLLLI. 
j_3__vt A^AJL 
,c<rvL< TTdue^C/t C—C -i^b 
OAjfcX • 
ACxXJL. -sis _U> 
_ -
, /SrA^\ar i , .o , 
irywn (7/wvjfc-A^un<, X ,<ft/-«4grO rt.ffA / / - i 2 - * . CH~\ 
i L a : ALrtrJ LL : 
_ _ J&~VL iU, X 
-rxvKslo ^ V ^ V C A - f»-/\jg ^Jfl r.Tf y\<
 f 
^dLt2 ^ I ^ T A T ^ • Tf) 4aaaL____ 
dli_^ 
^ 
11 <V'VrVH'W>W 
A . _ 
& _ 
LA__> __. 
C.rf/W _ttf - ii **y«*> , 
r,»v«i 
jfi JwLtf, JJ^Y>U i J12L 
__. 
If counter otfe\ .i expires st. 
. a.m.. p.m. . 1 9 . 
All above modifications or additions are hereby approved and accepted. 
fad ~*>.~3-//-Kc CMe Oate 
-a.m.. p.m. 
Oate Seller .a.m.. p.m. Oate 8uy*r 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
(Utah State Law requires broker to furnish copies of this contract bearing all signatures to Buyer and Seller. Dependent on the method used, one of 
the following forms must be completed.) 
I acknowledge^receipt of a final copwof the foregoing bearing all signatures: 
/.//-^y/a/A 
Oate 
% = r 
Seller Oate Buyer 
•3-fr-frr 
Oate 
Date 
-OR-
! personally caused a final copy of the foregoing agreement bearing all signatures to be mailed to the Seller Q. Buyer Q. 
on _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1 9 _ _ . by Certified Mail and the return receipt is attached hereto. 
(Broker) by 
ADDENDUM TO 
EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT 
V * ATTACHMENT Q COUNTER OFFER 
Reference is made tc EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT dated 
iU£w (Buyer) and 
aimrtg to the property pertaining n 
(Check Sox) 
19-
if\Si«e« 
, between 
„ (Seller) 
 situated at M- 11 Uh Si. ( ^ H ^ 
(f>.j>,A^ v r itY (A ) L^LL^ -1/7^ County. State of Utah. 
j
 " • * menttot Acceptance of the attached offer is contingent upon mutual agree ent  the following modified or additional terms and/or conditions which, upon 
acceptance, %hni\ be 6B9tr\9d incorporated in the oiiw previously set forth and shall control the terms of said instrument. 
4SU pUiM, frVKNLA ?X ^ CA.JVSJ\J^^ Qd/YTT 4- JL 4-JLL yiriArt*%X4 SLJ2* y 
Ju } A1. Q.A\ Atr\ t J l Q~i (,.yU'Yi.,u,tf +A ^ 
1T2_CILZ22 (L 11% MA** ? 4 uv> UA SIT/T^ Jh. 
^QJMAU. 
(sVO '•* pirn 
S • fT7T.'/ 
^ - - P y l J L A I - ^ O \S?<T.fyrTT^  
J f r u ^ , Ln^.Jc^X CA Jd<T ATN _ Uf*-> (^) SA£. 
iA*rUwA tntAd,^ nu/l^^tj/ ^ ^ jO_Q_ 
tfiQY^l sLnotfO ^(V^hhl -i 
'•'. counter offer, it expires at. 
.a.m., p.m.. . 1 9 -
Ail above modifications or additions are hereby approved and Accepted. 
^ •- • —^ n « i » Oate 
.a.m., p.m. 
Oete Seller 
-a.m.. p.m. 
Oate Buyer 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
(Utah State Law requires broker to furnish copies of this contract bearing all signatures to Buyer and Seller. Dependent on the method used, one of 
the following forms must be completed.) 
I acknowledge receipt of a fi/al copy of the foregoing bearing all signatures: 
Oate 
Seller Oate Buyer 
Oate 
Oate 
--OR-
I personalty caused a final copy of the foregoing agreement beering all signatures to be mailed to the Seller Q. Buyer Q. 
on _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1Q by Certified Ma ? and the return receipt is attached hereto. 
(Broker) by 
APPENDIX "D" 
Note/Agreement/Assignment (Exhibit 15) 
NOTE/AGREEMENT/ASSIGNMENT 
$.25.*.Q.Q.Q....Q.Q .St ; . . . . .Georg le | y t a h 
-AEEiLJti iSK??.. 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, jointly and severally, promise to pay to the order of 
_INTERWEST_^ 420 West 145 Nor th , S t . George 
_ U t a h J M 7 7 0 
XUtm^JJ^lWSJ&mL-l * *.„ DOLLARS ($?±>.9.91dL.)t 
together with interest from date at the rate of...T£P. ..§*}.4....9£e.7.!). .. per cerit (.. 9..\.r.%) per annum on 
the unpaid principaJ, said principal and interest payable as follows: 
The sum of $640.00 commencing on or before May 1, 1985 and the 
sum of $640.00 on or before the 1st. day of each and every month 
thereafter until the full amount, is paid. 
This note shall be due and payable in full upon the full payment. 
to Leon Sprouse of all amounts owed to him on the sale of the 
Oasis Motel, i f not e a r l i e r paid. 
Each payment shall be applied (ust to accrued interest and the balance to the reduction of principal. Any 
such installment not paid when due shall bear interest thereafter at the rate of.....Tw.eLue per 
cent 0,2^0--%) per annum until paid. 
If default occurs in the payment of said installments of principal and interest or any part thereof, or in 
the performance of any agreement contained in the Trust Deed securing this note, die holder hereof, at its 
option and without notice or demand, may declare the entire principal balance and accrued interest due and 
payable. 
If tills note is collected by an attorney after default in the payment of principal or interest, eidier with 
without suit, the undersigned, jointly and severally, agree to pay all costs and expenses of collection including 
A reasonable attorney's fee. 
or 
The Undersigned hereby sells, assigns and sets over to INTERWEST 
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES a $25,000.00 interest as security for the 
payments set forth above in and to that, certain Uniform Real Estate 
Contract dated March 29, 1985 by and between Leon Sprouse, Seller, 
and Arjen W. Jager, Buyer, covering the Oasis Motel, .located at. 231 
West St.. George Blvd, St. George, Utah. 
Further, the Undersigned hereby authorized and directs the escrow 
holder, Heritage Thrift and Loan to pay from the payments received 
under said escrow the full anount of this note/agreement to Interwest 
according to the terms of this agreement. 
The parties hereto understand and agree that this instrument, does 
not obligate the undersigned to personally pay the amounts set forth 
herein. The obligation for payment hereunder arises only out. of the 
payments received by Heritage under the Unifrom Real Estate Contract, 
referred to above. 
In the event that the buyer (Jager) or his heirs or assigns fails 
or refuses to make the required payments under said Unifrom Real Estate 
Contract, Interwest Commercial Properties may step in and take over / 
said contract. -5* /£-<m-? *3 sn**x**y f>s ^>^Uff u^t^ 7*^1,/<3ys*++**f ' * 
<-m 
APPENDIX "E" 
Assignment of Contract (Exhibit 16) 
"THIS IS A LEGALLY Bi NG CONTRACT IF NOT UNDERSTOOD K COMPETENT ADVICE." 
ASSIGNMENT OF CONTRACT 
THIS AGREEMENT, made in the City ot ™ ™ . 5 ? ° * i ? . , State of Utah on the ....?.??. day of 
hereinafter referred to as the a i ' s i g n " © ^ ^ ^ 
8 4 7 8 0 
hereinafter referred to as the assignees, 
WITNESSETH: 
WHEREAS, under date of . . M a r c h . . ? ? . 19 .95 . . . , 
L.eQO..5p.rQU.S.B , as sellers, entered into a Uniform Real Estate Contract with 
Arjen W. Jager 
as buyers, of W a s h i n g t o n , Utah, which contract is delivered herewith, wherein and whereby the said sellers 
agreed to sell and the said buyers agreed to purchase, upon the terms, conditions, and provisions therein set 
forth, all that certain land, with the buildings and improvements thereon, erected, situate, lying and being in 
the County of W a s h i n g t o n ..., State of Utah, and more particularly described as follows: 
See attached Schedule A 
Whereas the Seller has conveyed to Interutest Commercial Properties a security 
interest of $25,000 as set forth in the attached note agreement dated April 1, 
1985* Further the undersigned owner of Interutest Commercial Properties, Mel 
Watson does assign and transfer all interest in said note to Artie Edmunds of 
St. George Utah* 
to which agreement in wr i t ing , reference is hereby made for all of the terms, conditions and provisions 
thereof, and 
WHEREAS, the assignees desire to acquire from the assignors all of the right, title and Interest of the 
assignors in said property above described as evidenced by said written agreement. 
N O W , THEREFORE, it is hereby mutually agreed as follows: 
1. That the assignors in consideration of the Payment of Ten Dollars and other good and valuable 
consideration, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, assign to the assignees, all their right, title and 
interest in and to said above described property as evidenced by the aforesaid fcta>faMKx6btt4x£x*)<K)&X\*WXk 
of A p r i l 1 - , 1 9 . 8 S . . . concerning the obove described property. S e c u r i t y n o t e 
2. That to induce the assignees to pay the said sum of money and to accept the said contract, and the 
rights obligation pursuant thereto the assignors hereby represent to the assignees as follows: 
a . That the assignors have duly performed all the conditions of the said contract. 
b. That the contract is now in full force and effect and that the unpaid balance of said contract is 
$ . . 2 5 J O Q Q , wi th interest pa id to the .I.sfe. day of . A p r i l 19.9.5... 
c. That said contract is assignable. 
3. That in consideration of the assignors executing and delivering this agreement, the assignees cove-
nant wi th the assignors as follows: 
a . That the assignees wil l duly keep, observe and perform all of the terms, conditions and provisions 
of the said agreement that are to be kept, observed and performed by the assignors. 
b. That the assignees wi l l save and hold harmless the assignors of and from any and all actions, suits, 
costs, damages , claims and demands whatsoever arising by reason of an act or omission of the 
assignees. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, The parties hereto have hereunto set their hands and seals the day and year 
first above wri t ten. 
/Z^.^L^!J2s,#u> . . ^ £ / 4 . 4 . . ? ? n f c . ^ : <&*y^_. 
ITNCSt AtllCNONI 
PLAINTIFFS 1 
Fumisn^d by:/ V J > | f EXHIBIT I 
biwear • • • • • m J B A ^ M A t a ^ • "* * * / (**% \ 
APPENDIX "F" 
Assignment of Note (Exhibit 18) 
SEEK COAll'ETENT ADVISE" 
ASSIGNMENT OF KKKSTKK3SKXK NOTE u j£ <?{,-
THIS AGREEMENT, made in Iheci tvof 
24th day of A p r i l 
Draper , State of Utah on the 
1985 by and between ARTIE EDMUNDS 
hereinafter refened to as the assignors, and DRAPER BAflK ffl# TRUST. 
hereinafter referred to as tin* assignees, 
WITNESSETH: 
WHEREAS, under date of 4 - 1 - 8 5 , 1 0 , LEON SPROUSK, Maker 
tinUODCJCwitli INTERHEST COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES * as payee 
XXXJ&M^KK5> of S t . George. , Utah, which tmDdnoct is delivered herewith, wheiein and 
whereby the said sellers agreed to sell and the said buyeis agreed to purchase, upon the terms, con-
ditions, and provisions therein set forth, all that certain land, with the buildings and improvements 
thereon, erected, situate, lying and being in the County of , State of Utah, 
and more parlicularly described as follows: 
Note f u r t h e r a s s i g n e d t o A r t i e Edmunds by I n t e r v e s t Commercial P r o p e r t i e s 
by a s s i g n m e n t d a t e d A p r i l 2 , 1985 , a11 ,payment s on s a i d n o t e t o now be p a i d 
t o DRAPER DANK AND TRUST, 903 E a s t 12300 S o u t h , D r a p e r , Utah 84020 , by r e a s o n 
of t h i s a s s i g n m e n t . 
to which agreement in writing, reference is hereby made for all of the terms, conditions and provi-
sions thereof, and: 
WHEREAS, (he assignee desiie to acquire from the assignors all of the light, title and interest 
of the assignors in said propel ty above desciibed as evidenced by said wiitten agreement. 
NOW, THEREFORE, it is heieby mutually agiecd as follows: 
1. Thai the assignois is in oonsidoiation of I ho Payment of Ten Hollars and other good and valu-
able consideialion, the tcceipt of which is heieby acknowledged, assign to the assignees, all their 
right, title and inteiest in and lo said above described propeity as evidenced by the afoiesaid Uni-
fOfiMUZe&lCEaXKM^^ UoLn d td 4-1 . -85. , 1 9 . , concerning the above described 
property. 
2. That to induce the assignees to pay the said sum of money and to accept the said contract, 
and the rights obligation pursuant thereto the assignors hereby represents to the assignees as 
follows: 
a. That the assignors have duly performed all the conditions of the said contiact. 
b. That I he e<flQTRct is now in full force and effect and that the unpaid balance of said con-
t N £ g j s $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 , with interest paid to the . 4 - 1 - 3 5 . . day of , 
19 
c. That said contract is assignable. 
3. That the assignors arc executing and delivering this agreement, as security for a loan made 
to assignors under the terms of a promisory note of even date heiewith. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, The paities hereto have hetcunto set their hands and seals the day 
and year first above written. 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
Before me this 24 th day of A p r i l 198 
personally appealed ARTIE EDMUNDS X 
the signer/*; off 
foregoing sKsjgnmenl {ho duly acipmw^dge to me l(jiat 
thev execute 
APPENDIX "G 
Answer to Second Amended Complaint; 
Counterclaim Against Plaintiff and 
Cross-Claim Against Jagers 
WRIGHT & MILES 
John L. Miles 
Attorney for Defendant Edmunds 
60 North 300 East 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: (801) 628-2612 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LEON SPROUSE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ARJEN W. JAGER, NADA H. JAGER, ' 
ARTIE EDMUNDS, LLOYD WALTERS, 
and JOHN DOES I throgh V, 
Defendants. 
I ANSWER TO SECOND AMENDED 
1 COMPLAINT; COUNTERCLAIM 
I AGAINST PLAINTIFF AND 
i CROSS-CLAIM AGAINST JAGERS 
1 Civil No. 86-0982
 Ayl/)/_ 
> £*M¥^ 
COMES NOW defendant Artie Edmunds (hereinafter referred 
to as "Edmunds"), by and through his attorney, John L. Miles, and 
answers, counterclaims, and cross-claims as follows: 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT 
1. Defendant Edmunds denies the allegations of 
paragrpah 1 of the second amended complaint (hereinafter referred 
to as "complaint"). Defendant Edmunds claims he is the present 
owner of a $25,000.00 assignment of part of said contract, given 
by plaintiff to Interwest Commercial Properties, and that he is 
therefore a necessary party plaintiff in any foreclosure action. 
Attached hereto as Exhibit "A", and incorporated herein by this 
reference, is a copy of the NOTE/AGREEMENT/ASSIGNMENT given by 
plaintiff and which Edmunds now owns, pursuant to an ASSIGNMENT 
OF CONTRACT attached hereto as Exhibit "B", and made a part 
hereof by this reference* 
2. Defendant Edmunds admits the allegations of 
paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the complaint. 
3. Answering paragraph 5 of the complaint, defendant 
Edmunds admits that he became aware, on or about September 16, 
1986, that a lawsuit had been commenced between plaintiff and 
defendant Jager, but denies any specific knowledge about the 
alleged defaults of defendant Jager until on or about December 2, 
1986, when a notice was served upon his attorneyf and denies the 
remainder of said paragraph 5. 
4. Defendant Edmunds admits the allegations of 
paragraph 6 of the complaint. 
5. Defendant Edmunds denies the allegations of 
paragraph 7 of the complaint* Defendant Edmunds, as the owner of 
part of the subject Uniform Real Estate Contract, claims that he 
is a necessary party plaintiff in any action pursuant to said 
contract, and claims that his contractual rights thereunder are 
equal to those of plaintiff, the only difference being that his 
claim is of a lesser amount than plaintiff, i.e., the balance 
due (including interest and attorney's fees) on the $25,000.00 
assignment. Further, defendant Edmunds also claims the right, 
pursuant to Exhibits "A" and "B", and at his election, to take 
over the contract and begin making monthly payments to plaintiff 
at the time plaintiff delivers possession to him, but denies that 
he must make up all delinquent payments that accrued prior to the 
time defendant Edmunds was offered possession. 
6. Defendant Edmunds denies the allegations of 
paragraph 8 of the complaint, as defendant Edmunds claims to be a 
necessary party in making such an election. 
7. Defendant Edmunds denies the allegations of 
paragraph 9 of the complaint for lack of knowledge. 
8. Defendant Edmunds admits the allegations of 
paragraph 10 of the complaint, and any such claimed interest of 
defendant Nada R. Jager would also be inferior and subordinate to 
defendant Edmunds assignment of plaintiff's lien. 
9. Defendant Edmunds denies the allegations of 
paragraph 11 of the complaint for lack of knowledge. 
10. Defendant Edmunds admits the allegations of 
paragraph 12 and 13 of the complaint, and any such claimed 
interest of defendant Walters or others would also be inferior 
and subordinate to defendant Edmunds assignment of plaintiff's 
lien. 
COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST PLAINTIFF 
1. That defendant Edmunds is the present owner of a 
$25,000.00 interest in the Uniform Real Estate Contract between 
plaintiff and defendant Jager. 
2. That plaintiff gave, for valuable consideration, an 
assignment of a $25,000.00 interest in said contract to Interwest 
Commercial Properties, as shown by the attached Exhibit "A". 
3. That Interwest Commercial Properties thereafter 
assigned, for valuable consideration, the $25,000.00 interest in 
said contract to Edmunds, as shown by the attached Exhibit "B", 
and Edmunds is the present owner thereof. 
4. That Edmunds is therefore a necessary party 
plaintiff in any foreclosure action. 
5. That pursuant to the provisions of Exhibit *A", in 
the event of the sale of Oasis Motel, Edmunds is entitled to full 
payment of the balance owing on said $25,000.00, plus costs and 
attorney's fees. Edmunds is entitled to such full payment 
irrespective of how the Oasis Motel is sold and irrespective of 
the price obtained. Upon the payment to plaintiff of the amounts 
owed to him on any such a sale, the plaintiff is obligated to pay 
Edmunds in full at that time. 
6. That the Court should therefore order plaintiff to 
pay the balance owed to Edmunds immediately upon any sale, 
including a foreclosure sale. 
7. That Exhibit nA" also directs the escrow holder to 
pay the "full amount of this note/agreement" (emphasis added) 
from the payments received, and that paragraph 16C of the 
contract, under which plaintiff is proceeding, empowers the 
escrow holder or agent to act as Trustee in any such foreclosure. 
8. That the Court should direct Heritage Savings & 
Loan, the Escrow Agent appointed by plaintiff and defendant 
Jager, to apply the foreclosure proceeds first to the balance 
owed to Edmunds and then to the balance owed to plaintiff. 
9. That there has been a default in the payments 
required by said Exhibit "A" in that no payments have been made 
for several months. 
10. That said Exhibit "A" provides for payment of 
Edmunds attorney's fees and costs in the event of any defaultf 
and the Court should award costs and a reasonable attorney's feef 
and order that the same be paid in full along with the principal 
and interest owing upon any sale. 
11. That, as an alternative allegation in the event 
the Court finds that Edmund's claim should not be paid first, 
then Edmunds alleges that he is the owner and holder of an 
undivided interest in the entire Uniform Real Estate Contract, 
and that any payments received on said contract should be 
allocated to Edmunds on a pro rata basis, with the numerator 
being the balance (principal, interest, costs, and attorney's 
fees) owed to Edmunds and the denominator being the balance 
(principal, interest, costs, and attorney's fees) owed to 
plaintiff. 
12. That Exhibit "A" gives Edmunds the right or option 
to take over the contract in the event defendant Jager fails to 
make the required payments. 
13. That Edmunds is entitled to reasonable notice of 
Jagerfs failure to make the required payments before being called 
upon to either exercise that option to take over the contract or 
to forego that option. 
14. That Edmunds was not afforded the opportunity to 
exercise said option until defendant Jager was six or seven 
months behind on his payments. 
15. That Edmunds is entitled to exercise that option 
without being required to make up all the monthly payments which 
have accrued or will accrue prior to the time he was given notice 
and prior to the time he is allowed to take over without making 
up all those payments. 
16. That Edmunds is willing, able, and desirous of 
exercising his option to take over the contract and to begin 
making the regular monthly payments, but he is not able to make 
up the payments that accrued prior to the time he was given 
notice and opportunity to exercise his option. 
17. That Edmunds is entitled to possession of the 
premises concurrently with the accrual of his obligation to begin 
making the regular monthly payments to plaintiff, and until 
plaintiff is able to place Edmunds in possession, Edmunds is 
not required to make up any accrued payments or to make any 
ongong payments. 
18. That Edmunds is willing and able to take over the 
contract and to begin making monthly payments as they come due as 
soon as possession can be delivered to him, but without the 
obligation to make up any accrued and delinquent payments. 
CROSS-CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANTS JAGER 
1. That Edmunds is the owner and holder of a 
$25,000.00 interest in and to the payments due under that certain 
Uniform Real Estate Contract between plaintiff, as Seller, and 
defendant Arjen W. Jager, as Buyer, as shown by the Exhibits "A" 
and "B" attached hereto and incorporated herein by this 
reference. 
2. That Edmunds, under the assignment wherein he 
obtained said $25,000.00 interest, also obtained all of the 
rights of a Seller under paragraph 16 of said contract, including 
the right to treat the contract as a note and mortgage under 
paragraph 16C and to foreclose thereon. 
3. That defendant Arjen W. Jager has defaulted on his 
payments under said contract by failure to make payments for the 
months of June, 1986 through January, 1987. 
4. That Edmunds is an indispensable party to any 
foreclosure attempt by plaintiff as the owner of an interest in 
said contract. 
5. That Edmunds hereby elects the remedy of paragraph 
16C of said contract, and elects to join with plaintiff in the 
foreclosure of the property described in plaintiff's complaint 
under said paragraph, and Edmunds hereby declares the 
acceleration of all sums due under the contract. 
6. That any interest claimed by defendant Nada H. 
Jager in the property by reason of a deed recorded 6/21/86 in 
Book 380, Page 380 of the records of the Washington County 
Pecorder is inferior and subordinate to Edmunds interest and lien 
in the contract which is sought to be foreclosed by this 
cross-claim. 
7* That Edmunds is entitled, pursuant to the terms of 
Uniform Real Estate Contract, paragraph 14, to an award of his 
attorney's fees and costs in this matter by reason of the default 
of defendant Arjen W. Jager. 
8. That the Court should order the property sold at a 
foreclosure sale, and order the proceeds of the sale applied as 
required by law, and that after application of such proceeds, 
should there be a balance due and owing to Edmunds on the 
$25,000.00 interest he acquired by assignment of said contract, 
then Edmunds is entitled to a deficiency judgment against 
defendant Arjen W. Jager for that balance then owing. 
WHEREFORE, Edmunds prays for judgment as follows: 
1. On the counterclaim against plaintiff, for judgment 
declaring that Edmunds interest in the contract, together with 
costs and attorney's fees found by the Court, is required to be 
paid first from any proceeds of sale or other payments on the 
contract, prior to any payment to plaintiff. Alternatively, for 
judgment declaring that Edmunds interest in the contract, 
together with costs and attorney's fees, is that of an undivided 
interest in the entire contract and is required to be paid on a 
pro rata basis with the interest of plaintiff from any proceeds 
of a foreclosure sale or any other payments. Further, for 
judgment allowing Edmunds to take possession of the premises 
under his option without being liable to pay plaintiff the 
accrued and past due monthly payments under the contract, which 
are the obligation of defendant Jager who has been in possession, 
or which plaintiff has waived by failing to give Edmunds 
reasonable notice and opportunity to exercise the option and for 
failure to deliver possession of the premises to Edmunds 
concurrently with said notice and opportunity. 
2. On the cross-claim against defendants Jager, for 
judgment foreclosing the interest of said defendants in the 
subject property, both real and personal, and that the Court 
order the property sold and the proceeds be distributed as 
required by law to any prior interests, to the costs and 
attorney's fees of this foreclosure action, as found by the 
Court, and then to the amounts due Edmunds and plaintiff, as the 
Court determines their respective interests, and that Edmunds be 
awarded a deficiency judgment against defendant Arjen W. Jager 
for all amounts remaining unpaid after said foreclosure sale. 
DATED this 12th day of January, 1987. 
i?6hn L. Miles 
Attorney For Artie Edmunds 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 13th day of January, 1987, 
I mailed a true and accurate copy of the foregoing document on 
each of the following by first-class D. S. Mail, postage prepaid: 
GARY W. PENDLETON 
Pendleton & Terry 
50 East 100 South, Suite 101 
St. George, Utah 84770 
TERRY L. WADE 
Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom & Drake 
50 East 100 South #302 
P.O. Box 386 
St. George, Utah 84770 
^O^f M^L^ 
NOTE/AGREEMENT/ASSIGNHENT 
l.25.<.Q.Qfl^fl.O H^t..JSeorgeM l s MUjt8h 
jbBEiLh-. , w.?l 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, jointly and severally, promise to pay to the order of 
.JLWJSUWEST^ 1*5 No£th, St.. George 
„Utah_M7.7?. 
JCHEMTJ^JSE^IIinUSMIL* * 1 DOLLARS {t*bJ!?li?.L.)t 
together with Interest from date at the rate o f . .X??? . . . J . ! l^?5?"j ! . ?Mper cent ( i ! L . 5 % ) per annum on 
the unpaid principal, said principal and Interest payable as follows: 
The sum of $640.00 commencing on or before May 1, 1985 and the 
sum of $640.00 on or before the 1st day of each and every month 
thereafter until the full amount is paid. 
This note shall be due and payable in full upon the full payment 
to Leon Sprouse of all amounts owed to him on the sale of the 
Oasis Hotel, if not earlier paid. 
Each payment shall he applied first to accrued Interest and the balance to the reduction of principal Any 
such Installment not paid when due shall bear Interest thereafter at the rate of.~_T.we.lue per 
cent (L2«'Q*%) pt* annum until paid. 
If default occurs In the payment of said Installments of principal and Interest or any part thereof, or In 
the performance of any agreement contained In the Trost Deed securing this nott% the holder hereof, at Its 
option and without notice or demand, may declare the entire principal balance and accrued interest due and 
payable. 
If this note is collected by an attorney after default In the piymtnt of principal or Interest, either with 
or without suit, the undersigned, jointly and severally, agree to pay qlf costs and expenses of collection Including 
i reasonable attorney's fee. 
the Undersigned hereby sells, assigns and sets over to INTERWEST 
COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES a $25,000.00 interest as security for the 
payments set forth above In and to that certain Uniform Real Estate 
Contract dated March 29, 1985 by and between Leon Sprouse, Seller, 
and Arjen W. Jager, Buyer, covering the Oasis Motel, .located at 231 
West St. George Blvd. St. George, Utah. 
Further, the Undersigned hereby authorized and directs the escrow 
holder, Heritage Thrift and Loan to pay from the payments received 
under said escrow the full amount of this note/agreement to Interwest 
according to the terms of this agreement. 
The parties hereto understand and agree that this instrument does 
not obligate the undersigned to personally pay the amounts set forth 
herein. The obligation for payment hereunder arises only out of the 
payments received by Heritage under the Unifrom Real Estate Contract 
referred to above. 
In the event that the buyer (Jager) or his heirs or assigns fails 
or refuses to make tlie required payments under said Unifrom Real Estate 
Contract, Interwerf-Commercial Properties may step in and take over / 
said contract7 -S° /-<~^ o /sw, *^, ^ t~K^s u~~i" i^ja^r****" ' -
FHisasinr # 
••THIS IS A LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACT IF NOT UNDERSTOOD. SEC* COMPETENT AOVICE 
ASSIGNMENT OF CONTRACT 
THIS AGREEMENT, mode In the Cily of - 5 . L J 5 5 5 t S ? . , Slole of Utoh on the _ . .?"?. doy of 
™
A e H 2 u w ^ 
he*relrio"nerTiTerred *io os~ihe" o t s ^ ^ P.£l 
84760 
hereinofler referred lo 01 the assignee!, 
WITNESSETH! 
WHEREAS, under dole of ...?£«!?...?.?•
 # « g B 5 .. 
L.fSQn..5P.roy.?.B....
 v . 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ot sellers, entered Into o Uniform Real Ettole Contract wllh 
Ar Jen W. Jager _ _ 
at buyers, of W a s h i n g t o n , Utoh, which conlroct It delivered herewith, wherein ond whereby the sold tellers 
ogreed lo telt and the told buyers agreed to purchase, upon the terms, conditions, ond provisions therein set 
forth, oil that certain land, with the buildings ond Improvements thereon, erected, tituote. tying ond being In 
the County of W a s h i n g t o n
 # State of Utah, and more particularly described as follows 1 
See attached Schedule A..... 
Whereas the 5eiler has conveyed to Intertwest Commercial Properties a security 
Interest of $25,000 as set forth In the attached note agreement dated April 1, 
1985. Further the undersigned owner of lnterwest Commercial Properties, Wei 
Watson does assign and transfer all interest in said note to Artie Edmunds of 
St. George Utah. 
to which ogreement In writ ing, reference It hereby mode for olt of the terms, conditions ond provisions 
thereof* and 
WHEREAS, the assignees desire to acquire from the assignors oil of the right, title ond Interest of the 
ossignort In talc! property above described ot evidenced by sold written ooreement. 
. N O W , THEREFORE, tl is hereby mutually agreed as follows. 
1. That the assignors In consideration of the Payment of Ten'Dollars ond other good and valuable 
consideration, the receipt of which It hereby acknowledged, assign to 4he assignees, alt their right, title ond 
Interetl in ond lo toid above described properly ot evidenced by ibe oforesotd kWs*axFfo«>ix£*k><r>6oatoo*k 
of . . . . . A p r i l 1 1 9 . 8 5 . . . concerning (he above described properly. S e c u r i t y n o t e 
3. That to Induce the assignees to pay the said sum of money and to occept the sold contract, ond the 
rights obligation pursuant thereto the ossignort hereby represent to the assignees as follows: 
a. That the assignors hove duly performed all the conditions of the sold contract. 
b. That the contract It now In full force and effect ond lhat the unpaid balance of said contract is 
$..?5j.OOO with Interest paid lo the !?.£..• doy of . . . A p i i i . _ 19.?.$.... 
C. Thot ' toid conlroct Is assignable. 
3. That In consideration of ihe assignors executing and delivering this agreement, the assignees cove* 
nant with the assignors as follows! 
a. That the assignees wil l duly keep, observe and perform oil of the terms, conditions ond provisions 
of the Said agreement that ore to be kepi, observed ond performed by the assignors. 
b. That the assignees will save and hold harmless the ossignort of ond from any ond oil actions, suits, 
costs, domoges, claims and demands Whatsoever arising by reason of an oct or omission of the 
assignees. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, The parties hereto have hereunto set their hands ond seals the day and year 
Irst obovt written. 
UDutL CJL*A*AJKI~ 
WtiL^- . , 
+$Gf>/u °m cS 5 \ h*~> PCX/Hen X±~- - C-K&CY 
JourAtay 
APPENDIX "H" 
Transcript of testimony on attorney fees (pages 162-64) 
162 
a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s . 
THE COURT: Do you want to c r o s s Mr. Miles on 
a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s , Mr. Huntsman? 
MR. HUNTSMAN: Maybe we can reach a s t i p u l a t i o n as 
t o the r e a s o n a b l e n e s s . Obviously I 'm going to o b j e c t i f 
I 'm ob l iga ted — 
THE COURT: Do you know what h e ' s going to t e s t i f y 
to? 
MR. MILES: Should I make a p r o f f e r ? 
MR. HUNTSMAN: Make a p r o f f e r . 
THE COURT: Al l r i g h t . 
MR. MILES: Your Honor, I t e s t i f y t h a t on t h i s 
l a w s u i t , I have spen t a t l e a s t 150 hours of t i m e . I say 
" a t l e a s t " because I h a v e n ' t kept exac t r e c o r d s . I began 
t o keep some r e c o r d s when we go t i n t o the l a w s u i t and the 
Court was asking q u e s t i o n s about my a t t o r n e y ' s f ees on an 
hour ly b a s i s . Because my agreement with Mr. Edmunds was 
on a con t ingency ; s o , I d i d n ' t see t he need to keep 
r e c o r d s . 
But I did keep r e c o r d s , and I know t h a t I ' v e 
spen t a t l e a s t 150 hours on t h i s c a s e . And my hour ly fee 
i s $60 an hour, and t h a t would come t o $9,000 on 
a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s . 
Now, I need to q u a l i f y t h a t a l i t t l e b i t 
because t h i s case has been compl ica ted , and t h e r e ' s been 
163 
1 severa l i s sues . This case has not a l l been about the s u i t 
2 to recover the commission. Tha t ' s what we're t rying 
3 today, but not a l l of my time was spent on tha t pa r t of 
4 it. 
5 So to help the Court and counsel the best I 
6 couldf I would have to say that in defending the 
7 counterclaim that was brought by Mr. Jager and for 
8 misrepresentation on the part of both Mr. Sprouse and 
9 Mr. Edmunds, I probably spent at least a third of my time 
10 on defending that counterclaim/ and probably another third 
11 of my time was involved in trying to assert our rights to 
12 participate in a foreclosure and in working through the 
13 foreclosure with Mr. Pendleton and the arguments and 
14 hearings we had on that part of it. So about a third, 
15 actually, of my time has been trying to collect the note. 
16 THE COURT: So you're testifying your fees that 
17 you're asking for today are $3,000? 
18 MR. MILES: I'm asking for 9,000, but that would 
19 include the whole case. But I need to tell the Court that 
20 not all of it was on the note. And if the Court finds 
21 that I can only recover on the note, then it would be 
22 3,000. 
23 THE COURT: Mr. Huntsman, do you accept that 
24 proffer, that that's what he would testify if he were 
25 called and sworn? 
164 
1 MR. HUNTSMAN: That thatfs what he would testify 
2 to, yes, sir. 
3 THE COURT: Do you wish to cross-examine? 
4 MR. HUNTSMAN: No, Your Honor. 
5 THE COURT: Al l r i g h t . We'l l accept the pro f fer , 
6 then. 
7 Anything else, Mr. Miles? 
8 MR. MILES: No. We rest at this point, Your Honor 
9 THE COURT: All right. The defense? 
10 MR. HUNTSMAN: I'd like to call Leon Sprouse, Your 
11 Honor. 
12 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Sprouse, come forward 
13 and face the clerk and raise your right hand, please. 
14 
15 ELMER LEON SPROUSE, 
16 the witness herein, having been 
17 first duly sworn, was examined 
18 and testified as follows: 
19 
20 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
21 BY MR. HUNTSMAN: 
22 Q. State your full name for the record, please. 
23 A. Elmer Leon Sprouse. 
24 Q. Where do you live, Mr. Sprouse? 
25 A. 6291 South Pecos Road, Las Vegas, Nevada. 
